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STOCK OPTION PLANS FOR NON-EXECUTIVE EMPLOYEES
ABSTRACT

We examine determinants of non-executive employee stock options outstanding, grants,
and exercises for 756 firms during 1994 to 1997. We find that firms use greater stock option
compensation when facing capital requirements and financing constraints. Our results are also
consistent with firms using options to attract certain types of employees, provide retention
incentives, and create incentives to increase firm value. After controlling for economic
determinants and stock returns, option exercises are greater (less) when the firm's stock price hits
52-week highs (lows), which confirms in a broad sample the psychological bias documented by
Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999).

1.

Introduction
The corporate use of stock option plans for non-executive employees is widespread and

growing. A 1999 survey by William M. Mercer reported in USA Today finds that the percentage
of large firms granting stock options to at least half of their employees increased steadily from
17% in 1993 to 39% in 1999. In some companies, stock options are used so extensively that
institutional shareholders have begun recently to refuse approving increases in the number of
shares available for options. While option grants to CEOs have received considerable attention in
the literature, there has been no large-sample research on option plans for non-executive
employees.1 We contribute to the literature on corporate option plans by describing a large
sample of non-executive option plans, and examining the determinants of i) non-executive option
holdings, ii) grants of options to non-executives, and iii) non-executive option exercises.
In a broad sample of 756 firms with option plans during the years 1994 to 1997, we find
that options are granted extensively to non-executive employees. We define non-executive
employees as all employees other than the five most highly compensated executives, as
identified in the proxy statement. On average, the number of options outstanding to all
employees exceeds 6.9% of shares outstanding. Non-executive employees hold 67% of these
options, although this percentage varies substantially across our sample firms. On a peremployee basis, the mean (median) firm's non-executive employees hold option portfolios
valued at over $17,000 ($3,000).
Following previous literature on CEO option plans (e.g., Yermack, 1995; Core and Guay,
1999a), we investigate the hypothesis that options are used to provide both incentives and

1

Existing research on equity compensation to non-executive employees includes Huddart and Lang (1996), who
examine option exercise behavior of 50,000 non-executive employees at eight corporations, and Frye (1999), who
finds an association between Tobin's q and the proportion of total employee compensation that is equity
compensation for a panel of 326 firm-year observations from 1992 to 1994.
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compensation. To understand the dynamics underlying these plans, we explore both the level of
options held by employees and the flow of options into the plan via grants of new options and
out of the plan via option exercises. If firms use options to attract and retain employees, or to
provide employees with incentives to increase firm value, we expect that the level of options
held by employees varies predictably with firm characteristics. To test this hypothesis, we
develop a cross-sectional model for the level of option incentives held by non-executive
employees based on theory and empirical work on the distribution of equity incentives within
and across organizations (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Jensen and Meckling, 1992; Smith and
Watts, 1992; Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith, 1995).
We hypothesize that firms grant new options to non-executive employees both as a
substitute for cash compensation and to adjust aggregate incentive levels. Because option grants
require no contemporaneous cash payout, we expect that a firm substitutes grants of options for
cash compensation when it needs cash and when its external financing is relatively more costly.
Further, we predict that firms make grants of new option incentives when the level of options
outstanding provides insufficient incentives, and that grants of incentives are positively related to
contemporaneous exercises of option incentives. We model new grants of options and option
exercises as a system of simultaneous equations to reflect their expected interdependencies. We
hypothesize that option exercises are a function of economic factors related to employee riskaversion, such as the amount of risk imposed on employees through previously granted and
newly granted options, and to psychological factors related to employees using 52-week highs
and lows as reference points (Heath, Huddart, and Lang, 1999).
Our empirical results strongly support the hypothesis that options are granted to nonexecutives more intensively when firms have greater financing needs and face financing
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constraints. Further, we find support for our hypothesis that the level of options outstanding is
related to economic determinants of firms' use of equity incentives. However, we find mixed
evidence that firms actively manage the level of non-executive option incentives through annual
grants. Finally, our evidence strongly supports that option exercises are influenced by economic
factors related to employee risk-aversion, and by the psychological reference point bias
documented by Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999), who use longitudinal exercise data from seven
firms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our
hypotheses with respect to the level of option holdings, grants of options, and option exercises.
We describe the data in Section 3, present the results of our empirical tests in Section 4, and
conclude in Section 5.
2.

Hypothesis development
Our primary hypothesis is that firms grant options to non-executive employees to provide

equity incentives, to attract and retain certain types of employees, and as a substitute for cash
compensation. To test the hypothesis that firms use non-executive option plans to provide equity
incentives and employee-retention incentives, we first develop a cross-sectional model of the
economic determinants of option incentives. We define equity incentives from options as the
change in the optionholder’s wealth for a one-percent change in shareholder value. To examine
the use of stock options in compensating non-executive employees, as well as to explore further
the role of options in providing equity incentives to non-executives, we model new grants of
options and option exercises as a system of simultaneous equations to reflect their
interdependencies. We summarize our predictions in Table 1, and discuss the theoretical and
empirical support for our predictions in the following sub-sections.

3

2.1.

The level of options outstanding
Theory and empirical findings suggest that executive contracts implicitly or explicitly

require that executives hold equity incentives (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg, Hubbard,
and Palia, 1999). For non-executive employees, it is less clear whether firms use options for
incentive purposes because the ability of lower-level employees to influence the stock price
through their individual actions is limited. However, the use of stock options potentially induces
mutual monitoring and thereby improves group incentives. Further, because employees generally
are required to exercise their options at the time of departure, thereby forcing suboptimal early
exercise, firms use options to retain employees (Hale, 1998). The retention incentive is
reinforced by the fact that options commonly have a vesting period of two to three years (Kole,
1997). Finally, the commitment by firms to require employees to hold options can serve to attract
certain types of employees, such as employees with low risk-aversion.
We predict that firms provide equity incentives more intensively to non-executives when
direct monitoring of employees is costly. Direct monitoring of lower-level employees is expected
to be more costly when the firm is larger and more decentralized, when there is greater noise in
the firm's operating environment, and when the firm has greater growth opportunities (Demsetz
and Lehn, 1985; Jensen and Meckling, 1992; Smith and Watts, 1992). Because there are likely to
be economies of scale in monitoring, the need for equity incentives is expected to increase at a
decreasing rate with firm size. On the other hand, in large firms, lower-level employees are less
likely to be able to influence stock price through their individual actions. Thus, the expected
relation between firm size and the use of stock options to provide incentives is ambiguous. We
use the logarithm of the market value of assets (measured as the sum of the market value of
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equity and the book value of liabilities) and the number of employees as proxies for
decentralization and firm size.
Similar to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), we use the logarithm of idiosyncratic risk as a
proxy for noise in the firm’s operating environment. The logarithmic transformation captures
Demsetz and Lehn's prediction that, because of risk aversion, equity incentives will increase at a
decreasing rate with noise. We measure idiosyncratic risk as the standard deviation of the
residual return from a 36-month market model regression. Following Smith and Watts (1992),
we use the book value of assets divided by the market value of assets as a proxy for growth
opportunities and expect that firms with greater growth opportunities have lower book-to-market
ratios. We also use the three-year average of research and development expense scaled by assets
as an additional measure of growth opportunities.
The prevalence of vesting periods for options and the requirement that employees
immediately exercise options when they leave the company suggests that firms use options to
retain employees. We predict that the importance of retaining employees is greatest in firms
requiring higher quality managers and in firms where human capital is a relatively more
important factor of production. Smith and Watts (1992) hypothesize that firms with substantial
growth opportunities require higher quality managers, and Core and Qian (2000) predict that
lower-level employees receive more options at firms where growth opportunities are more
strongly related to human capital. As described above, we use the book-to-market ratio and
research and development expense scaled by assets to capture growth opportunities. As a proxy
for the importance of human capital, we use the amount of growth options per employee, which
we define as (market value of equity minus book value of equity) divided by the number of
employees. The predicted positive relation between growth opportunities and the use of stock
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options is reinforced if firms with risky growth options also seek to attract employees that are
relatively less risk-averse, since highly risk-averse workers are likely to avoid companies that tie
a substantial proportion of their wealth to stock price.
Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995) argue that interdependencies among operating
units increase the usefulness of aggregate performance measures in evaluating lower-level
managers. They predict that interdependencies, and therefore aggregate performance measures,
decrease with product-line and geographic diversification, and increase with sales between
segments. Their findings are consistent with these predictions.2 Because stock options tie
employee wealth to aggregate firm performance, we expect that equity incentives from stock
options are negatively associated with corporate diversification and positively associated with
sales between segments.
Following Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995), we use two entropy measures of
diversification. Total product diversification is calculated from data on the Compustat Industry
Segments File and is equal to ΣPiln(1/Pi), where Pi is dollar sales of principal product i scaled by
total firm sales. Geographic diversification is calculated from data on the Compustat Geographic
Segments File and is equal to ΣGiln(1/Gi), where Gi is dollar sales for geographic segment i
scaled by total firm sales. We use intersegment sales scaled by total net sales to measure
interdependencies between firms’ segments.
In addition to the systematic economic determinants of options use described above, we
also expect that there exist firm-specific determinants of options use. To control partially for
these determinants, we include a measure of the intensity with which firms use options for top
executives. We predict that firms use non-executive options more intensively in business
2

Keating (1997) predicts a more complex relation between division interdependencies and equity-based
compensation, but finds no evidence of this relation.
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environments where options are particularly useful in monitoring top management. We measure
the intensity of options use for top executives as the residual from a regression of top-five
executives’ equity incentives from options on size, growth opportunities (book-to-market and
R&D expense), and idiosyncratic risk. The option intensity variable also helps to control for
alternative incentive mechanisms that firms use as substitutes for employee stock options, which
we cannot observe or measure as precisely as we can the use of stock options.3
Finally, we include 22 industry indicator variables in the specification to control for
industry effects.4 Our annual model for the level of option plan incentives held by non-executive
employees is summarized as:
Option plan incentivesit-1 = β0 + β1Log(market value of assets)it-1
+ β2Log(# of employees)it-1
+ β3Log(Idiosyncratic risk)it-1 + β4Book-to-marketit-1
+ β5R&Dit-1 + β6Growth options per employeeit-1
+ β7Total diversificationit-1 + β8 Intersegment salesit-1
+ β9Geographic diversificationit-1
+ β10 Top 5 option residualit-1
+ β11 Industry controlsit-1 + εit-1
2.2.

(1)

Option grants
We hypothesize that firms grant new options to non-executive employees both as a

substitute for cash compensation and to make adjustments to aggregate incentive levels. Because
grants of equity require no contemporaneous cash payout, firms with cash constraints are
expected to use these forms of compensation as a substitute for cash pay (Yermack, 1995;
Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan, 1996). Because employees are risk-averse and have relatively short
investment horizons, workers are expected to require a risk premium to accept equity

3

In sensitivity tests described below, we show that our results are robust to including indicator variables for two
common forms of alternative equity incentive mechanisms: the existence of a restricted stock plan and the existence
of an employee stock ownership plan.
4
To generate reasonable estimates for the indicators, we combine 59 two-digit SIC codes into 23 industry groups.
Our results are robust to instead including 58 two-digit SIC code indicators.
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compensation in lieu of cash. However, the value of the tax deferral that employees receive from
stock compensation can reduce this premium. In addition, provided that the information
asymmetries between the firm and its employees are lower than those between the firm and
outside investors, equity compensation can have cost advantages relative to external equity
financing. We expect that equity compensation is substituted for cash pay by companies with
cash constraints, high capital needs, high costs of accessing capital markets, and a relatively
greater interest in attracting less risk-averse workers.
We proxy for cash constraints with measures of cash flow shortfall and interest burden.
We define cash flow shortfall as the three-year average of [(common and preferred dividends +
cash flow used in investing activities - cash flow from operations)/total assets].5 Interest burden
is the three-year average of interest expense scaled by operating income before depreciation. To
mitigate the influence of a discontinuity in interest burden at zero, we set interest burden equal to
one for the 3.5% of our sample firms with interest expense greater than operating income before
depreciation (i.e., where interest expense is positive and operating income is either negative, or
positive but less than interest expense). Our proxies for capital needs and cost of accessing
capital markets are the book-to-market ratio and R&D expense as defined in Section 2.1. We
also include a long-term debt indicator variable. Firms that have been unable to secure long-term
debt are expected to be substantially constrained with respect to the debt markets.
Another motivation for substituting stock option compensation for cash compensation is
the reduced impact of compensation on earnings, that is, cash compensation is expensed whereas
the value of stock option grants is disclosed in the footnotes to the financial statements. Thus, we
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We use three-year average values for several of the explanatory variables in our grant and exercise regressions
because we expect that firm policy on granting options is persistent, and does not vary with short-term fluctuations
in the hypothesized determinants.
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expect that firms with earnings constraints grant more stock options, ceteris paribus. Because
interest burden restrictions are a very common covenant in debt agreements, we expect that in
addition to being a proxy for cash constraints, this variable is also a proxy for earnings
constraints.
We control for the marginal tax rate as a potential determinant of option grants
(Yermack, 1995; Matsunaga, 1995; Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan, 1996; Hall and Liebman, 2000).
When future corporate tax rates are expected to be higher, the future tax deduction from deferred
compensation becomes more favorable relative to the immediate tax deduction received from
cash compensation. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the use of stock-based compensation is expected
to be less costly for firms with low marginal tax rates.6 To capture variation in firms’ marginal
tax rates, we use two indicator variables. The first variable (Low marginal tax) equals one if the
firm has negative taxable income and net operating loss carry-forwards in each of the previous
three years, and zero otherwise. The second variable (High marginal tax) equals one if the firm
has positive taxable income and no net operating loss carryforwards in any of the three previous
years, and zero otherwise. Plesko (1999) finds that this classification of firms into low, medium

6

From the employee's perspective, deferred compensation such as restricted stock and options always provides a
higher after-tax return (before adjusting for risk) than a cash payment of equal value because taxes on the return are
deferred (Miller and Scholes, 1980; Smith and Watts, 1982). If an option is non-qualified (tax-qualified under
Internal Revenue Code Section 422), the employee's gain is taxable on exercise (on sale of stock) as ordinary
(capital gains) income.
With a qualified option, the firm receives no tax deduction. For non-qualified options, the firm receives a
deduction at the time of exercise (for options that are disqualified when the employee sells the stock within one year
of exercise, the firm receives a deduction at the time of sale). Although we are unable to distinguish between
qualified and non-qualified options in our sample, the tax costs of non-qualified (qualified) options relative to cash
compensation are expected to be less (at least as small) for low-tax firms. Further, it seems likely that many
employees forfeit the tax benefits of qualified options granted by our sample firms by not holding the stock obtained
through exercise. This follows from the observation that early exercise is frequent in our sample, and that it would
not be rational for an employee to exercise a qualified option early unless he or she expects to sell the stock
immediately.
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(in the intercept), and high marginal tax rates performs nearly as well as more complex proxies
for marginal tax rates.
If firms use options as a substitute for cash compensation in a fixed proportion, total
compensation and option grants are expected to be greater when firm performance is stronger.
Empirical examinations of CEO option grants tend to find a positive association between grant
levels and contemporaneous performance (e.g., Baber, Janakiraman, and Kang, 1996;
Janakiraman, 1998; Core and Guay, 1999a). There is also anecdotal data that firms grant options
to reward performance. For example, General Electric Company grants options to lower-level
employees with above-average performance evaluations, but only when the entire firm has
performed well (Hymowitz and Murray, 1999). We use current year and previous year stock
returns as proxies for firm performance.
In addition to using options as a substitute for cash compensation, we expect that when
firms use options to provide non-executive employees with incentives and/or to attract and retain
employees, deviations from target incentive levels influence the magnitude of new option grants.
Core and Guay (1999a) find that option grants to CEOs are negatively related to deviations from
target incentive levels. We use Equation (1), described in Section 2.1, to estimate the target level
of non-executive option incentives as a function of firm size, monitoring difficulty, growth
opportunities, decentralization, and the importance of human capital. We use the residuals from
individual annual estimations of this cross-sectional model to estimate the extent to which a
given firm’s existing level of option incentives is above or below their target level. Under the
joint hypothesis that firms seek to maintain a target level of option incentives for their nonexecutive employees, and that Equation (1) fully captures the determinants of this target level,
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we expect a negative relation between the residuals estimated at the end of year t-1 and the
option incentives provided by new grants in the following year t.
If Equation (1) fails to capture important firm-specific determinants of option plan levels,
and the omitted determinants are uncorrelated with future option grants, the expected negative
correlation between the residuals estimated at year t-1 and option incentives granted in year t will
be biased toward zero. Alternatively, if the same important firm-specific determinants of nonexecutive option plans are omitted from both Equation (1) and our model of option incentives
granted in year t, a positive correlation can be induced between the residuals estimated at year t-1
and option incentives granted in year t.
Option exercises decrease the level of option incentives outstanding. Therefore, we
expect that if firms manage option incentives around a target level, greater grants of options are
made during years when option exercises are greater. Note that this argument does not imply that
employees have perverse incentives to exercise options solely for the purpose of inducing larger
option grants. Assuming that the level of an employee’s compensation is determined by market
forces, as option compensation increases, firms will substitute away from other forms of
compensation, such as cash pay. Because we argue below in Section 2.3 that grants of options
also are expected to be a determinant of exercises, we model grants and exercises as a system of
simultaneous equations. Janakiraman (1998) documents a simultaneous relation between annual
option grants and exercises by CEOs, in which larger exercises lead to larger grants. We also
include log(sales) and log(number of employees), in conjunction with the industry controls, to
control for the industry-mean compensation expense as a fraction of sales.7

7

We cannot control for compensation expense directly because this variable is not reported on Compustat for 75%
of our firms. Further, because this Compustat item tends to be reported most frequently by low-growth industries
such as utilities, it is subject to substantial selection bias.
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The foregoing arguments suggest the following model for option grants to non-executive
employees, in which option grants are measured during year t and, with the exception of current
year stock return and option exercises, the determinants of option grants are measured at the end
of year t-1:
Grants of option incentivesit = β0 +β1Cash flow shortfallit-1 +β2Book-to-marketit-1
+β3 R&Dit-1 + β4Long-term debt indicatorit-1
+β5 Interest burdenit-1 + β6Low marginal taxit-1
+β7 High marginal tax it-1 + β8 Stock returnit
+β9Stock returnit-1 + β10 Incentive residualit-1
+β11 Incentives exercisedit
+β12 Log(sales)it-1 + β13Log(# of employees)it-1
+β14 Industry controlsit-1 + uit
(2)
2.3.

Option exercises
Huddart and Lang (1996) and Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999, hereafter, HHL) examine

the determinants of option exercise using samples of 5,060 monthly observations on eight firms,
and 12,145 weekly observations on seven firms, respectively. We use their findings as a basis
for testing predictions about option exercise for our sample of 1,264 years of exercise data on
568 firms. Compared to their data, our sample is more aggregated and we do not have
information on individual grants or on the individuals holding the grants. On the other hand, we
have a much larger and broader sample of firms, and we can control for grants made
concurrently as a possible determinant of exercise.
Economic models such as Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) and Huddart (1994)
predict that risk-averse employees exercise early and are more likely to exercise early when a
greater proportion of their wealth is tied to the stock price. It is costly to exercise options early
because it involves forfeiting the time value of the option. Accordingly, we follow HHL and
predict that option exercises are greater when the realizable value of an employee's options is a
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larger fraction of the options' Black-Scholes value. As a proxy for this fraction, we estimate, for
each firm-year, the total realizable value of non-executives' option holdings divided by the
Black-Scholes value of these holdings. This variable is equal to the difference between beginning
of year stock price and the average exercise price of the options held at the beginning of the year,
divided by the estimated beginning of the year Black-Scholes value per option held. The measure
takes on a value close to one when most of the employees' options are deep-in-the money, and
takes on negative values when the options are out-of-the money.8 Because employees' exercise
decisions are made at the individual grant level, as opposed to a portfolio level, this proxy
contains more measurement error when exercise prices are more heterogeneous across the
options in a firm's option plan. Consistent with the intuition in Vargus (1998), we also predict
that risk-averse employees exercise more options to rebalance their portfolios when they hold
more options at the beginning of the year, as measured by the residual from Equation (1), and
when they receive higher grants during the year.
HHL predict and find that option exercises are related to psychological factors that are
hard to explain within the context of rationality. They document two separate psychological
biases, one related to individuals' beliefs that short-term trends in stock returns reverse
("beliefs"), and the second related to individuals' tendency to set reference points with respect to
stock price highs and lows ("reference points").
HHL's beliefs story is based on experimental findings that individuals believe that shortterm price trends (as proxied by the returns four weeks and six months prior to exercise) will
reverse, and that long-term price trends (as proxied by returns for the six-month period ending

8

Because the Black-Scholes value of an option approaches zero as the stock price drops further below the exercise
price, the realizable value ratio can take on large negative values. However, all of our results are robust to setting
negative values of this ratio equal to zero.
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six-months before exercise) will persist. We are unable to conduct a powerful test of the HHL
belief hypothesis because we have data on annual (not weekly) exercises, and we do not have
data on the portion of the option portfolio that is exercisable. Therefore, we include the stock
return for the current year and previous year in our model of exercises, but do not predict the
direction of the association.
HHL's second prediction is that option holders set reference points with respect to stock
price levels over the previous year. In support of this prediction, they find strong and robust
evidence that option exercises increase immediately following the time that the current stock
price exceeds its previous 52-week high.

Assuming that greater exercises following price

increases can be rationalized, the fact that the stock price exceeds a 52-week high conveys no
marginal information and should have no explanatory power.

We operationalize HHL's

prediction within our data by predicting that total annual option exercises is an increasing
function of the number of months within that year that the stock price hit a 12-month high. For
example, because we expect an increase in exercises each month that the stock hits a 52-week
high, we expect more exercises if the stock hits 52-week highs in 9 of the 12 months, than if it
hits highs in 3 of the 12 months. We also extend HHL's hypothesis by predicting the corollary
that option exercises are a decreasing function of the number of months within the current year
that the stock price hits a 12-month low. We compute these variables using CRSP monthly
closing prices. Each of the variables has a potential range from 0 to 12.
Last, we examine whether the amount of options exercised by non-executive employees
predicts future returns. For a sample of top-level executives, Vargus (1998) finds that currentyear exercises are negatively associated with the following year's returns. If non-executive
employees have private information about the firm's prospects, they are likely to be able to trade
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on this information more easily and more discretely than executives, who are subject to more
extensive disclosure requirements. We include the return over the year following exercise in our
model, and predict that this variable is negatively associated with option exercises if employees
have private information about firm value.
We include log(sales) and log(number of employees) in our specification to control for
size. Based on the prior analysis, we estimate the following model for option exercises by nonexecutive employees:
Exercise of option incentivesit = β0 + β1Incentive residualit-1 + β2 Incentives grantedit
+ β3 Fraction of BS value realizableit-1 +
+ β4Number of price highsit +β5Number of price lowsit
+ β6Stock returnit+1 + β7 Stock returnit + β8Stock returnit-1
+ β9Log(sales)it-1 + β10Log(# of employees)it-1
+ β11Industry controlsit-1 + uit
(3)
3.

Sample and variable measurement
In this section, we describe our sample selection process and the data we use to test our

hypotheses. We use data from four sources. From the firms’ 1997 10-Ks, we obtain data on firmwide option grants and exercises for 1995, 1996, and 1997, and data on options outstanding for
1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997.9 We obtain data on the top-five executives' option holdings and
option grants from the Standard and Poor’s Execucomp database. We use CRSP data to generate
measures related to stock price performance, stock-return volatility, and treasury bond yields.
Compustat is our source for firms’ financial data and industry classifications.

9

Our measure of stock options includes stock appreciation rights (SARs) that are issued in tandem with stock
options. SARs have the same payout structure as options, except that upon exercise, the holder receives the excess of
the stock price over the exercise price in cash. A tandem SAR is paired with a stock option with the same terms, and
the exercise of the SAR (option) cancels the related option (SAR). Our measure of stock options does not include
freestanding SARs (SARs with no attached stock option), as there is no required disclosure on non-tandem SARs.
While such an omission causes error in our measure of option incentives, this error is likely to be small; non-tandem
SARs are rarely used because they have a higher accounting expense than tandem SARs and no countervailing
benefit.
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3.1.

Sample selection
We obtain an initial sample of 1,059 firms from the Execucomp database. We remove

firms from this initial sample if the firms are banks (SIC 6000-6199), or if the firms have missing
10-K, CRSP or Compustat data. We exclude firm-years when a target company's option plan is
merged into the option plan of an acquirer. We also remove firm-years in which a company
makes an acquisition using the pooling of interests method, and all firm years prior to this
acquisition, because the pooling method combines the acquirer's and target's options for all years
before and including the acquisition year. We remove firm-years in which the 10-K data on
aggregate options and exercise prices does not match with the Execucomp data on total options
and exercise prices for the top-five executives.10 Finally, we remove firm-years that have no
options outstanding.11
The resulting sample consists of 756 firms and 2,349 firm-years of observations on
options outstanding for fiscal years 1994 to 1997. Panel A of Table 2 summarizes the option
plans. On average, the total number of options outstanding to all employees is 6.9%, with a range
from just over 0% up to 37%. Non-executive employees hold 66.9% of all outstanding options.
However, this percentage varies substantially across the sample firms, with a standard deviation
of 18.7% and a range of nearly 100%. The magnitude of the non-executive option plans is also

10

Examples of this lack of match occur when options held by the top-five executives are greater than total options
outstanding, or when the exercise price of executive stock options is greater (lower) than the high (low) price for the
year. Examples of reasons for lack of match with the Execucomp data include missing Execucomp data, coding
errors in Execucomp, firms attributing grants made after the fiscal year-end to the current fiscal year, and the fact
that reported option grants to top-five executives include grants of options on subsidiary stock made to the top-five
executives. Note that our measure of optionholdings is upwardly biased in some cases where top-five executives
receive grants of options on subsidiary stock. This is because we can only filter out this problem when the number of
options held by the top-five executives is greater than total options outstanding.
11
Approximately 8% of the firm-years do not have option plans. By conducting our analysis only on firms with
option plans, we risk introducing a sample selection bias into our data. To address the possibility of such a bias, we
follow Heckman (1979) and estimate a probit model for firms' choice of whether to use options, and include the
inverse Mills ratio as an additional regressor. All of our results are robust to including the inverse Mills ratio. For
parsimony and for ease of exposition, we report results from OLS regressions.
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substantial on a per employee basis. The mean (median) firm's non-executive employees hold
option portfolios worth $17,296 ($3,143).
Panel B of Table 2 provides a breakdown of the non-executive option plans into 23
industry groupings. Column 1 reports the distribution of the sample firms across industries and
indicates that no single industry contains more than 10% of the sample. Columns 2 through 5
describe the median characteristics of the option plans. In Column 2, the overall size of the
option plans (including options held by top-five executives and non-executives) range from 1.8%
of shares outstanding for the utilities, to 11.3% and 14.4% for the pharmaceutical companies and
computer companies, respectively, with most of the industries clustering between 4% and 7%.
The fraction of options outstanding held by non-executives ranges from 55.2% to 83.0%, and is
reported in Column 3. Column 5 indicates that there is substantial variation across industries
with respect to option portfolio value per employee. For the median utility firm, the average
employee holds an option portfolio valued at $747. In contrast, for the median computer and
drug company, the average per employee option portfolio value is much larger at $23,218 and
$49,103, respectively. While the differences across industries are large, we expect that a
considerable amount of this variation can be explained by the firm characteristics modeled in
Equation (1). We explore this expectation further in Section 4.1.
To estimate our model for the level of options use at time t-1, we use the subsample of
696 firms and 1,694 firm-years with data on options outstanding for fiscal years 1994 to 1996.
For our analysis of option grants and exercises, we delete firm-years for which data is not
available to construct our explanatory variables, and firm-years in which option repricings took
place. Of the resulting sample of 1,615 observations, 285 firm-years are deleted because year t-1
data on the option residual or the fraction of the Black-Scholes value realizable is missing. After
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deleting firms for which the option grant or exercise is zero, the sample consists of 1,263 firmyears with non-zero values for both grants and exercises during fiscal years 1995-1997.12
3.2.

Measures of option incentives and option compensation
We define option incentives as the change in the dollar value of the holder's options for a

1% change in the stock price. Consistent with prior research by Jensen and Murphy (1990),
Yermack (1995), and Hall and Liebman (1998), we estimate the sensitivity of an option’s value
to the stock price as the partial derivative of option value with respect to price (the option
"delta"). Like this prior research, we assume that the appropriate risk-neutral valuation for an
employee stock option is given by the Black-Scholes (1973) model, as modified by Merton
(1973) to account for dividend payouts. The delta for a typical, newly granted, long-term
executive stock option is approximately 0.75, which means that the option value increases by
$0.75 when the stock price increases by $1.00. To transform this option delta into the dollar
change in the value of the option for a 1% change in the stock price, we multiply the option delta
by 1% of the firm's stock price.13
When we compute the option delta, we face the problem that the grant and exercise data
are aggregated over the year and reflect an average exercise price over the year. This aggregation
is not expected to introduce substantial error into our calculations as the delta calculated using

12

The requirement that we have year t-1 data raises the possibility of a sample selection bias that potentially effects
our estimation of Equations (2) and (3). However, when we model the selection and include the inverse Mills ratio
as an additional regressor, all of the results reported in Tables 7 and 8 are robust to its inclusion.
13
We acknowledge that the Black-Scholes model produces a biased measure of option value in this setting because
employee stock options do not satisfy the assumptions of standard option pricing models (i.e., a risk-neutral holder,
no vesting period, and the ability to transfer the option to another party). These features of employee stock options
are generally believed to induce early exercise. As such, a more accurate description of our empirical methods is that
we use the Black-Scholes model to produce an instrumental variable to capture cross-sectional variation in option
plan delta. It is also important to note that our estimate of option plan delta is likely to be a relatively unbiased
measure of an employee's incentives to increase the stock price because an option's delta is relatively insensitive to
differences in time-to-exercise. For most parameter values, the delta for a 5-year option is not substantially different
from that of a 10-year option. For example, the delta of an at-the-money 10-year option is 0.76 for a stock with
volatility of 0.3 and dividend yield of 1% when the risk-free rate is 6%. The delta decreases only to 0.72 if the
maturity of the option is reduced to 5 years.
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the weighted average exercise price is unbiased and highly correlated with the delta that would
be computed if the underlying portfolio structure were known (Core and Guay, 1999b). To
estimate the incentives from total options outstanding at the end of the year, we use the method
described in Core and Guay (1999b). The essence of this method is first to calculate the delta
provided by the most recent grant and then to calculate the delta of the remainder of the portfolio
as if it were a single grant. The delta of the total portfolio is the sum of these two values. The
portfolio, grant, and exercise are all valued using the year-end stock price.
We examine two measures of option incentives and one measure of the proportion of
incentives held by non-executive employees. The two option incentive measures are the
logarithm of the level of incentives held by non-executive employees and the logarithm of the
average level of incentives per employee (i.e., total non-executive incentives divided by total
number of employees).14 The second of these incentive measures is a proxy for the average
employee's wealth change for a percentage change in firm value, and the first measure is a proxy
for the wealth change of all the non-executive employees for a percentage change in firm value.15
Our third measure of options use is the proportion of incentives held by non-executive
employees as a fraction of the total option incentives to all employees.

14

In addition to our measure of average incentives per employee, it would be interesting to examine the average
incentives per employee covered by the option plan. However, this data is not publicly available. In Section 4.4, we
discuss this limitation and present sensitivity analysis using data on our sample firms that grant options to more than
50% of their employees.
15
In contrast to our measure of equity incentives as the dollar change in employee wealth for a percentage change in
firm value, many prior researchers on CEO equity incentives focus on fractional ownership measured as the dollar
change in CEO wealth for a dollar change in firm value (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Yermack, 1995). While
there is debate over the appropriateness of alternative measures of CEO incentives (Haubrich, 1994; Baker and Hall,
1998; and Core and Guay, 1999a), the Jensen-Murphy-Yermack fractional ownership measure seems less
appropriate for a group of lower-level employees, each of whom owns only a very small fraction of the firm.
However, our reported results are qualitatively similar if we estimate Equations (1), (2), and (3) using the fractional
ownership measure as the dependent variable.
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4.

Results

4.1.

The level of equity incentives
Tables 3 and 4 present descriptive statistics for the incentive measures and their

hypothesized determinants, respectively. In Panel A of Table 3, the median change in the value
of options held by non-executive employees for a 1% change in stock price is $264,723. This
variable is substantially skewed (mean = $1,294,686) and, as discussed above, we use the
logarithmic transformation of this measure in our tests. The log of option incentives is much less
skewed, with a mean of 12.57 and median of 12.49. To mitigate the influence of outliers, the
upper- and lower-most percentiles for each independent and explanatory variable are set equal to
the values at the 1st and 99th percentiles in each year, respectively. Panel B of Table 3 reports that
correlations between our measures of option incentives range from 0.21 to 0.56. We report
descriptive statistics on the explanatory variables in Table 4.
In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, we present OLS results for our two measures of
incentives provided to non-executive employees. Because we have multiple time-series
observations per firm, we calculate t-statistics based on Huber-White robust standard errors,
which are a generalization of the White (1980) standard errors that are robust to both serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity (Rogers, 1993). We include twenty-two indicator variables to
control for industry effects in each model. Although the residuals we use in estimating Equations
(2) and (3) are based on individual annual regressions, for parsimony, we present in Table 5 the
results of regressions pooled over the three sample years from 1994 to 1996 with year indicator
variables.
The results in Table 5 support the incentive theory outlined in Section 2.1. Firms with
greater monitoring costs and greater growth options (as proxied by firm size, the book-to-market
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ratio and R&D expense) provide greater option incentives to non-executive employees.16 The
positive coefficients on log(MV assets) in Columns 1 and 2 are significantly less than one,
indicating that the level of incentives provided to non-executives increase at a decreasing rate
with firm size. Controlling for the number of employees, the results on firm size are consistent
with our prediction that there are economies of scale in monitoring, and that equity compensation
increases at a decreasing rate with firm size. There is a positive and significant association
between option incentives and growth options per employee in Columns 1 and 2, indicating that
firms use non-executive options more intensively when human capital is a relatively more
important factor of production. As predicted, in Columns 1 and 2 there is a positive relation
between option incentives and log(idiosyncratic risk), our proxy for noise in the operating
environment. Consistent with our prediction, when firm-specific factors result in above average
optionholdings by top-five executives, lower-level employees also hold above average quantities
of options.
The dependent variable in the Column 3 regression is the proportion of total option
incentives given to non-executives. This variable is interpreted as a measure of how intensively
firms use options for non-executive employees relative to how intensively they use options for
top executives. Consistent with larger firms being more decentralized and delegating decision
rights deeper into the organization, we find that non-executive employees hold a larger fraction
of total option incentives as firm size and the number of employees increase. The fraction of
incentives held by non-executive employees also has a significant negative association with the
book-to-market ratio and a positive association with R&D expense. These results are consistent
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By including both the market-to-book ratio and R&D expense as proxies for growth options, we potentially
introduce multicollinearity that causes individual t-statistics to be understated. F-tests reject the exclusion of either
or both variables. In Section 4.4, we note that our qualitative inference is unaffected if we use book-to-market (or
R&D expense) as the sole proxy for growth options.
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with the interpretation that decision rights, and therefore equity incentives, are pushed deeper
into the organization when growth opportunities are more important, after controlling for firm
size.
Finally, we find mixed results related to segment diversification and intersegment sales.
Consistent with the prediction and results of Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995), we find a
negative (positive) association between segment diversification (intersegment sales) and option
incentives for lower-level employees in all three columns, but this association is only significant
in Column 2 (Columns 1 and 2). There is no consistent relation between option incentives and
geographic diversification.17
4.2.

Grants of option incentives
Our hypothesis predicts that grants and exercises of option incentives are determined

simultaneously. As such, we estimate a simultaneous model of grants and exercises using twostage least squares. We assume that the grant and exercise variables are endogenous and that the
remaining explanatory variables are exogenous. We identify the model by exclusion restrictions.
Comparing Equations (2) and (3), the seven variables related to financing costs, need for capital,
and ability to borrow are expected to be related to grants but not exercises. Similarly, the four
variables related to the Black-Scholes value captured by exercise, psychological reference points,
and future returns are expected to be related to exercises but not grants. Although three-stage
least squares has the potential to provide more efficient estimates, we use two-stage least squares
to avoid transferring any mis-specification that could occur in one equation into the other
equation. Descriptive statistics for the independent variables are presented in Table 6.

17

If geographic diversity is dropped from the regression, the coefficient on total diversification becomes significant
in Column 3, and inference on the remaining coefficients in all three columns is unaffected.
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In Table 7, we find strong evidence that stock option grants are more heavily used by
companies with cash constraints, high capital needs, and high costs of accessing capital markets.
Again, because we have multiple time-series observations per firm, we calculate t-statistics based
on Huber-White robust standard errors. The explanatory power of both models is quite large,
with an adjusted R-squared of 73.9% in Column 1 and 67.3% in Column 2. Consistent with the
hypothesis that cash-constrained firms grant options more extensively to non-executive
employees, we find significant positive coefficients on cash flow shortfall. The coefficient in
Column 1 (Column 2) indicates that if a firm has a cash flow shortfall one standard deviation
greater than average, its option grant is approximately 20% (11%) larger than average.18 Further,
in support of the hypothesis that firms with high capital needs or high financing costs grant more
options, the coefficients on book-to-market and R&D expense are of the predicted sign and
significant. The interest burden coefficients are positive and significant, providing support for
both the cash constraint and earnings constraint hypotheses. The coefficients on the indicator
variable for firms with long-term debt are of the predicted signs, but are not significant.19 Table 7
also indicates that the level of option grants to non-executive employees is lower for firms with
high marginal tax rates, and is positively related to contemporaneous performance.20
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While the delta (the sensitivity of option value to stock price) is the appropriate variable for testing our hypotheses
about option incentives, the option value is the appropriate variable for testing our hypotheses that firms use option
grants for financing purposes. All of our results in Table 7 are robust to estimating Equations (1), (2), and (3) using
the Black-Scholes value of the options, instead of the option delta.
19
An F-test rejects the restriction that the coefficients on both long-term debt and interest burden are zero. If the
indicator variable for long-term debt is dropped from the regression, the coefficients on interest burden are more
significant, and the inference on the remaining coefficients is unaffected. Conversely, if interest burden is dropped
from the regression, the inference is unchanged on the remaining variables, and the coefficient on long-term debt
remains insignificant.
20
Results are unaffected if we drop the dummy variable for low marginal tax rate from the regression. We also
obtain similar results (on a smaller sample because of missing data) if we use Graham's (1996) simulated marginal
tax rates.
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The models in Table 7 provide mixed evidence on the hypothesis that firms manage
incentive levels for non-executive employees toward a target level. The coefficient on
contemporaneous exercises is positive in both Columns 1 and 2, and is significant in Column 1.21
Although not tabulated, a more direct test indicates that when lagged option exercises (i.e.,
option exercises in year t-1) is included instead of contemporaneous exercises, its coefficient is
significantly positive in both columns, which provides evidence that grants are larger following
larger exercises. Thus, there is some evidence that firms make additional grants to reinstate
equity incentives lost through options exercise. However, in contrast to our prediction, the
association between the year t-1 incentive residual from Equation (1) and new incentive grants is
positive and significant. This positive association suggests that firms with unusually large nonexecutive option plans make unusually large option grants to non-executives.
As described in Section 2.2, a positive correlation can be induced between the incentive
residuals estimated at year t-1 and option incentives granted in year t if the same important firmspecific determinants of non-executive option plans are omitted both from Equations (1) and (2).
While the explanatory power of our two models is quite high, the possibility remains that firmspecific factors, such as the willingness of employees to accept options as a component of
compensation, or firm-specific cash constraints, are omitted from Equations (1) and (2).22 An
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Note that the form of the option exercise variable varies across the columns to match the form of the dependent
variable. For example, in Column 2 exercises are measured as log of incentives exercised per employee since the
dependent variable is log of incentives granted per employee. We also appropriately match the dependent and
independent variables in the analysis of option exercises that follows in Section 4.3.
22
Even though we control for growth opportunities in the Equation (1), it is conceivable that the use of option
incentives is fundamentally different for high-growth firms. To explore this possibility, we split the sample based on
four proxies for differences in growth: (1) low / high book-to-market; (2) no / positive R&D expense; (3) large /
small market value of assets; and (4) NASDAQ (20% of our sample) / non-NASDAQ firms. We then estimate
Equations (1) and (2) for each of the two groups. In each of the four cases, we find that the coefficient on the
incentive residual is positive and significant in Equation (2) for both high- and low-growth firms. Thus, any misspecification in Equation (1) does not appear to be due to forcing the high- and low-growth firms to have the same
coefficients in the pooled regression.
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alternative explanation for an omitted firm-specific factor is that firms’ option plans for nonexecutives are not yet at equilibrium. This lack of equilibrium is plausible given that options use
for lower-level employees has grown rapidly in recent years, and that firms continue to extend
options deeper into the organization. One scenario that is consistent with our results is a type of
leader/follower game in which firms gradually decide to grant options deeper into the
organization, and the firms that began this process earlier have more options outstanding and
make larger grants each year. In this case, firms that have previously granted options to a large
fraction of their employees are expected to have large residuals in year t-1 and large grants in
year t, leading to a positive bias in the relation between the year t-1 residuals and year t option
grants.
4.3.

Exercises of option incentives
The option exercise results in Table 8 support the findings in Heath, Huddart and Lang

(1999) that option exercises are related to both rational economic factors as well as to
psychological factors that are hard to explain within the context of rationality. The significant
positive coefficient of 0.96 on log of option grants in Column 1 indicates that a 10% higher than
average grant results in exercises that are 9.6% higher than average. This result is consistent with
risk-averse employees actively managing their exposure to stock price risk by exercising a larger
number of options when they receive larger grants of options. Note that even though a 10%
greater than average option grant induces exercises that are 9.6% greater than average, most
firms' option plans have grown substantially over the sample period because, on average, the
number of options granted has been about twice as large as the number of options exercised.
The significant positive coefficient on the incentive residual is also consistent with
exercises being influenced by employee risk-aversion. That is, when firms impose a greater than
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average level of incentive risk on their employees, the employees respond by exercising more of
their portfolio of options. We find strong evidence that option exercises are greater when the
realizable value of the option portfolio captures a greater percentage of the Black-Scholes value,
indicating that non-executive employees recognize that it is costly to exercise options early
because it involves forfeiting the time value of the option.
We find strong support for the HHL prediction that option holders set reference points
with respect to stock price levels over the previous year. Option exercises are significantly
positively related to the number of months within the current year that the stock price hit a 12month high, and significantly negatively related to the number of months within the current year
that the stock price hit a 12-month low. This finding is difficult to explain within the context of
rationality because these reference point variables load in the regression even in the presence of
variables that capture the expected influence of stock price movements on optimal exercise
practices (i.e., the recent stock return and the extent to which the average option held is in the
money).23 A potential explanation for this finding is that our reference point variables are
correlated with measurement error in our proxies for the effect of stock returns on exercise
behavior. For example, a firm can have an annual return of 0% and yet the stock price can still
hit several 12-month highs or lows during the year which trigger higher or lower than average
exercises. When we include 11 annual rolling returns by month in the regression to control for
this potential measurement error, the inference with respect to the reference point variables is
unchanged.
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If volatility influences the exercise behavior of risk-averse employees, it is possible that the interpretation of our
two reference point measures is confounded by their correlation with stock return volatility. However, the inclusion
of return volatility in the exercise regression as an additional explanatory variable does not affect our inference.

26

We find a significant positive relation between option exercises and stock return in the
previous year. This result is consistent with risk-averse employees exercising more options
when a run-up in stock price pushes their options further into the money, thereby increasing the
exposure of the employees' wealth to changes in stock price. Finally, we find no evidence that
option exercises by non-executives reflect private information about future returns. The
coefficient on future returns is insignificant in both columns.
4.4

Sensitivity Analyses
Our findings are robust to a number of different specifications. We obtain qualitatively

the same results in Tables 5, 7, and 8 if: (i) we use log(sales) or log(MV of equity) instead of
log(MV assets) as a proxy for firm size in Equation (1) or, (ii) we use only book-to-market as a
proxy for growth options (and drop R&D expense) from Equations (1) and (2). If we use only
R&D expense as a proxy for growth options (and drop book-to-market) in Equations (1) and (2),
we obtain qualitatively the same results in Tables 5 and 8, and the inference with respect to
growth opportunities and cash constraints in Table 7 remains the same. However, in the grant
regression, the coefficient on the long-term debt indicator gains significance, and the coefficients
on interest burden and high marginal tax rate lose significance.
One shortcoming of our options data is that although we can compute the total number of
options granted to all employees, the number of employees to whom options are actually
provided is rarely disclosed. Recall that we gather our data from firms' 10-Ks and proxy
statements, and beyond aggregate option plan data, there is no requirement that firms describe
details about their granting practices with respect to non-executives.24 Because we do not know
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To check whether information is available on broad-based options use by our sample firms, we randomly select
twenty firms and use electronic keyword searches of their 1997 10-Ks and proxies for any discussion of the number
or proportion of employees that have options. None of the firms in this sample give specific information on the
proportion of their employees to whom they grant options, although some firms indicated that they have option
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the proportion of all employees that receive options, we have a potential problem with our
measures of option incentives per employee. To see this problem, consider two firms that have
the same number of options outstanding, but Firm A grants options to 10% of its employees and
Firm B grants options to 100% of its employees. Since Firm A grants 10 times more options to
each employee covered by the option plan, the incentives per covered employee is much greater
at Firm A. However, because we cannot identify this difference in our data, our measures of
incentives per employee would be identical for Firms A and B.
To ensure that this problem does not affect our inference, we match our sample to a list of
companies that grant options to a majority of their employees. This list, compiled by the
National Center of Employee Ownership (NCEO, 2000) from surveys and from firms'
announcements of broad-based option programs, enables us to construct additional tests of our
hypotheses that are not possible using data disclosed in the 10-Ks and proxy statements.
However, we recognize that the NCEO variable has limitations. First, the list likely includes
firms that adopted broad-based option plans after 1997. Second, the survey data gathered by
consulting firms potentially reflects response biases related to size and industry, and biases
related to the consultants' marketing incentives. The advantage of this data is that it is publicly
available to anyone who wishes to purchase it, and the NCEO has a reputational interest in the
quality of the data. Accordingly, we believe that this measure of broad-based option plan use is
the best measure that is available for our broad sample.
We first examine whether the decision to provide options to a greater proportion of
employees is consistent with our theory described in Section 2.1. We estimate a probit model
where the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if our sample firm is on the

plans that cover non-executives.
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NCEO list of firms that provide options to a majority of their employees, and zero otherwise
("the majority option indicator"). Approximately 16% of our sample firms appear on this list. 25
The independent variables in this probit model are the same as in Table 5. In untabulated results,
we find that, consistent with our previous findings, firms that provide options to a majority of
their employees are larger, have greater growth opportunities, and use options more intensively
for their top 5 executives. In contrast to our previous results, the coefficient on growth options
per employee is not significant.
To test whether our lack of data on the proportion of employees covered causes inference
problems in our earlier tests, we add the majority option indicator to our regression estimations
of the levels model in Equation (1) and of the grant model in Equation (2). An insignificant
coefficient on this variable indicates that the measurement problem described above is prevalent
in our data, i.e., total option incentives do not, on average, increase with the proportion of total
employees covered under the plan. By contrast, a positive and significant coefficient on the
majority option variable indicates that, on average, when a firm chooses to provide options
incentives to more employees, it increases the total amount of option incentives outstanding.
Because the decision to grant options to a majority of employees is endogenously
determined, we follow Maddala (1983) and use an instrumental variables method that replaces
the majority option indicator variable with the fitted probability from the probit model described
above.26 Although the probit model contains the same regressors as Equation (1), the model is
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Consistent with the figures from the William M. Mercer survey of the 250 largest firms that we cite above (Carey
and Ward, 1999), there is a 29% prevalence of broad-based plans among the largest 20% of our sample. There is a
13% prevalence of broad-based plans in the remainder of the sample.
26
The instrumental variables regression specification follows Maddala (1983). If I is an endogenous dummy
variable, Maddala (p. 121) notes that the unconditional expectation of y = xβ + γI + ε is equal to xβ + γprob(I=1). To
see this, note that E[y] = prob(I=1)(xβ + γI + E[ε|I=1]) + prob(I=0)(xβ + E[ε|I=0]) = xβ + γprob(I=1) + E[ε] = xβ +
γprob(I=1).
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identified because the fitted probability is a non-linear function of these regressors (Maddala,
1983, p. 121). When the instrumental variable is added to Equation (1), its coefficient is positive
and significant and none of the inference from Table 5 changes. When the new residual from the
adjusted Equation (1) specification and the instrumental variable are added to Equation (2), the
coefficient on the instrumental variable is positive and significant. The inference from the model
is unchanged with respect to the importance of cash flow constraints and growth opportunities,
but the coefficients on R&D expense and high marginal tax rate lose significance. Overall, these
findings suggest that our inability to observe the actual proportion of employees that receive
options does not affect our inference described above.
Finally, we recognize that other equity incentive mechanisms exist that are potential
substitutes for employee stock options. A restricted stock plan is one such mechanism. An
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) is another. We believe that our use of the top 5 incentive
residual in the regressions serves to control for the use of these alternative means, but as a
sensitivity test, we control for the existence of these plans directly with two indicator variables.
The restricted stock variable is equal to one if the firm has a restricted stock plan, and zero
otherwise. We infer that the firm has a restricted stock plan if restricted stock is granted to any of
the top-five executives during the sample period (from Execucomp). The ESOP indicator
variable is equal to one if the firm's 10-K indicates the existence of an ESOP plan during the
sample period. Again, these variables are endogenous, and we instrument the variables by
replacing each indicator with the fitted probability values from probit regressions. When these
instrumental variables are added as regressors to the models in Table 5, 7, and 8, their
coefficients are insignificant, and they have no effect on the estimated coefficients on the other
regressors.

30

5.

Conclusion
In a broad cross-section of corporations, we find evidence consistent with firms granting

non-executive options for both incentive purposes and as a means of internal finance. The level
of option incentives varies in a manner consistent with economic theory. As predicted, we find
that the level of non-executives' option incentives is increasing in firms' growth opportunities,
the relative importance of human capital as a factor of production, and firm size. Firms use nonexecutive option grants as a substitute for cash compensation to a greater extent when firms face
cash flow constraints, and when the costs of external capital are greater.
We find mixed evidence that firms actively manage the level of non-executive option
incentives through annual grants. In support of this hypothesis, we find that firms make
additional grants to reinstate incentive effects lost through options exercise. However, in contrast
to our prediction, firms that have unusually large non-executive option plans make unusually
large option grants to non-executives. This finding suggests either that there exist important firmspecific reasons for granting options to non-executive employees that are not captured by our
models, or that firms have not, on average, reached equilibrium in the way they provide stock
option incentives to non-executives.
Our findings suggest at least two avenues for future research. First, we confirm the
findings of Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) that the exercise practices of non-executive
employees reflect psychological biases. It is not obvious how to incorporate these biases into the
traditional economic assumption of a rational, effort-averse agent with a concave utility function
over wealth. If individuals possess psychological biases that influence the perceived value of
their options, a fruitful avenue for further research is to develop a parsimonious model for agent
utility that predicts these biases, and then use this model to examine the effect of these biases on
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the incentives provided by equity compensation. A useful starting point for such a model would
be similar to efforts that are being undertaken in the asset pricing literature (e.g., Odean, 1998).
While option plans for top executives have seen widespread use for decades, option plans
that include employees at all levels are a relatively recent phenomena. Our research contributes
to understanding why firms use employee stock options by providing large-sample evidence on
options use that generally supports economic predictions. Having established these baseline
large-sample results, a promising avenue for further research is to investigate smaller, more
homogeneous samples to better understand the dynamics of employee option plans. For example,
these samples can be used to investigate further the use of options as a financing tool, and how
stock compensation fits into the "pecking order" of financing alternatives. The willingness of a
firm's lower-level employees to accept options instead of cash compensation likely depends on
firm-specific factors such as the payoff they or their co-workers have received from previously
granted options. In turn, these firm-specific factors are likely to affect how stock option plans
evolve over time. In research-in-progress, we examine the use of options for incentive and
financing purposes using a sample of 240 companies with high growth opportunities and a range
of needs for equity finance.
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Table 1
Summary of hypotheses regarding the determinants of grants, exercise,
and holdings of options by non-executive employees

1.

Level of option incentives

Hypothesized determinant

Predicted association

Size / decentralization
Idiosyncratic risk
Growth opportunities
Top executive option intensity
Importance of human capital
Diversification
2.

+/+
+
+
+
-

Option grants

Hypothesized determinant

Predicted association

Cash flow shortfall
Information asymmetry
Ability to borrow / sell debt
Marginal tax rate
Lagged residual from levels model
Contemporaneous exercises (simultaneous)
Contemporaneous performance
3.

+
+
+
+

Option exercises

Hypothesized determinant

Predicted association

Contemporaneous grants (simultaneous)
Realizable value / option value
Current and lagged return
Price hits high
Price hits low
Future return

+
+
?
+
-
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Table 2
Summary statistics

Panel A: Summary statistics for non-executive employee stock option plans
Mean

Std. dev.

Minimum

Q1

Median

Q3

Maximum

Number of options outstanding scaled by
shares outstanding

6.9%

5.3%

0.01%

3.2%

5.5%

9.2%

37.0%

Black-Scholes value of options
outstanding scaled by MV equity

3.7%

3.8%

0.01%

1.2%

2.5%

4.9%

24.1%

Fraction of total options outstanding held
by non-executives

66.9%

18.7%

0.01%

55.7%

69.4%

81.5%

100.0%

Number of options held by non-executives
scaled by shares outstanding

4.5%

3.6%

0.01%

2.0%

3.5%

6.0%

28.7%

$17,296

$54,478

$0.1

$1,044

$3,143

$10,109

$1,226,819

Total options outstanding

Non-executive options outstanding

Black-Scholes option portfolio value per
non-executive employee

The sample consists of 2,349 firm-year observations from 1994 to 1997. Options are valued using the Black-Scholes (1973) model, as modified by Merton (1973) to
account for dividend payouts.
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Panel B: Industry median values for non-executive employee stock option plans

Industry
Utilities
Petroleum products
Industrial equipment
Real estate
Agriculture, fishing, and mining
Communications
Automobile manu. and suppliers
Lumber and paper products
Food
Stone, glass, and metal products
Transportation
Airplane manu. and suppliers
Chemical products
Non-bank financial institutions
Wholesale trade
Media and entertainment
Consumer goods
Service
Electronic equipment
Retail trade
Software
Pharmaceuticals
Computers

% of
Total options /
sample shares outstanding (%)
(1)
(2)

7.0%
2.2%
4.0%
1.0%
6.4%
2.9%
2.8%
4.6%
2.7%
7.6%
4.1%
0.9%
5.8%
8.7%
3.6%
3.4%
4.1%
4.2%
9.6%
4.0%
2.3%
6.3%
2.0%

1.8%
2.8%
4.1%
4.2%
4.3%
4.4%
4.5%
4.5%
4.9%
5.2%
5.4%
5.5%
5.5%
6.1%
6.5%
6.7%
6.7%
7.0%
7.4%
7.5%
10.2%
11.3%
14.4%
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Non-exec options /
total options (%)
(3)

Non-exec options /
shares outstanding (%)
(4)

Option portfolio
value per non-exec
employee ($)
(5)

65.9%
79.8%
70.1%
55.2%
62.7%
69.4%
73.6%
75.7%
83.0%
67.0%
62.7%
76.7%
74.1%
66.5%
70.6%
72.7%
67.0%
69.7%
75.8%
62.5%
79.3%
70.6%
72.8%

1.2%
2.5%
2.5%
2.2%
2.5%
2.7%
3.4%
2.5%
3.7%
3.3%
3.4%
4.8%
3.9%
3.8%
4.5%
4.7%
3.7%
4.5%
4.9%
4.4%
8.6%
6.7%
10.7%

747
3,562
3,018
1,749
6,818
4,343
1,079
1,735
4,271
1,986
1,491
2,263
5,055
9,324
2,526
3,259
1,654
2,550
6,868
857
11,447
49,103
23,218

Table 3
Summary statistics for the level of non-executive equity incentives
from stock option plans and their determinants
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Variable

Mean

Std Dev

Q1

Median

Q3

1,294,686

3,262,589

85,314

264,723

919,650

Log of option incentives

12.57

1.73

11.35

12.49

13.73

Option incentives per employee

219.44

511.21

20.19

55.94

158.83

4.09

1.59

3.01

4.02

5.07

68.41%

19.68%

56.16%

71.17%

83.85%

Option incentives

Log of option incentives per employee
Fraction of total options outstanding
held by non-top-five employees

Panel B: Correlation matrix
(correlations with an absolute value greater than 0.045 are significant at a 0.05 level)

Variable
Log of option incentives

1.00

Log of option incentives per employee

0.48

1.00

Fraction of total options outstanding
held by non-top-five employees

0.56

0.21

1.00

The sample consists of 1,694 firm-year observations from 1994 to 1996. Non-executive option plan incentives is the
sensitivity of the total value of stock options held by non-top-five employees to a 1% change in stock price. Options are
valued using the Black-Scholes (1973) model, as modified by Merton (1973) to account for dividend payouts.
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Table 4
Summary statistics for the determinants of the level of non-executive equity incentives from
stock option plans

Variable

Mean

Std Dev

Q1

Median

Q3

Log(MV assets)t-1

20.89

1.52

19.73

20.79

21.90

Log(# of employees)t-1

8.49

1.73

7.49

8.53

9.68

Log(idiosyncratic risk)t-1

-1.32

0.45

-1.66

-1.37

-1.01

Book-to-markett-1

0.65

0.24

0.48

0.67

0.84

R&Dt-1

0.04

0.07

0.00

0.00

0.05

Growth options per employeet-1

0.32

0.56

0.04

0.12

0.31

Total diversificationt-1

0.70

0.54

0.24

0.63

1.09

Intersegment salest-1

0.01

0.03

0.00

0.00

0.00

Geographic diversificationt-1

0.35

0.41

0.00

0.00

0.69

The sample consists of 1,694 year observations from 1994 to 1996. Log(MV of assets) is the logarithm of the market value
of the firm's equity plus the book value of the firm's liabilities. Log(# of employees) is the logarithm of the number of
employees. Log(idiosyncratic risk) is the logarithm of the standard deviation of the residual from a market model regression
estimated over 36 months of returns ending with the fiscal year-end (subject to a minimum of 12 monthly returns). Bookto-market is (book value of assets) / (book value of liabilities + market value of equity). R&D is the three-year average of
research and development expense scaled by assets. Growth options per employee is (market value of equity – book value
of equity) / number of employees (in millions of dollars). Total diversification is an entropy measure of total product
diversification calculated from data on the Compustat Industry Segments File and equal to ΣPiln(1/Pi) where Pi is dollar
sales of principal product i scaled by total firm sales. Intersegment sales is interindustry segment sales scaled by total net
sales. Geographic diversification is an entropy measure of geographic diversification calculated from data on the Compustat
Geographic Segments File and equal to ΣGiln(1/Gi) where Gi is dollar sales represented by geographic segment i scaled by
total firm sales.
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Table 5
Determinants of the level of non-executive equity incentives
from employee stock option plans
Dependent variable
Independent
variable

Predicted Log of option
sign
plan incentivest-1
(1)

Log of option
plan incentives
per employeet-1
(2)

Fraction of
incentives held
by non-execst-1
(3)

0.10
(3.64)

0.02
(1.82)

Log(MV assets)t-1

+/-

0.73
(16.20)

Log(# of employees)t-1

+/-

0.21
(4.52)

Log(idiosyncratic risk)t-1

+

0.38
(4.29)

0.44
(4.09)

-0.0013
(-0.06)

Book-to-markett-1

-

-2.03
(-12.02)

-1.90
(-9.40)

-0.13
(-3.68)

R&Dt-1

+

2.98
(6.21)

3.52
(6.60)

0.29
(2.96)

Growth options per employeet-1

+

0.0002
(3.10)

0.0011
(14.13)

0.00003
(1.82)

Total diversificationt-1

-

-0.05
(-0.73)

-0.20
(-2.79)

-0.02
(-1.51)

Intersegment salest-1

+

2.20
(3.36)

2.15
(3.01)

0.23
(1.07)

Geographic diversificationt-1

-

0.14
(1.88)

-0.04
(-0.48)

-0.02
(-1.18)

Top 5 option residualt-1

+

0.47
(13.98)

0.47
(12.25)
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0.05
(4.85)

Table 5 (continued)
Determinants of the level of non-executive equity incentives
from employee stock option plans
Dependent variable
Independent
variable

N
Adjusted R2

Predicted Log of option
sign
plan incentivest-1
(1)
1,652
81.7%

Log of option
plan incentives
per employeet-1
(2)

Fraction of
incentives held
by non-execst-1
(3)

1,652
69.3%

1,694
25.3%

The sample consists of 1,694 firm-year observations from 1994 to 1996. T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on HuberWhite robust standard errors. Coefficients on an intercept, 22 industry indicator variables and two year indicator variables
not shown. The regression model is described by Equation (1) in Section 2.1. All dependent variables are based on options
held by non-top-five employees and are measured at time t-1. Non-executive option plan incentives is the sensitivity of the
total value of stock options held by non-top-five employees to a 1% change in stock price. Options are valued using the
Black-Scholes (1973) model, as modified by Merton (1973) to account for dividend payouts. Top 5 option residual is the
residual from a regression of top-five executives’ equity incentives from options on size, book-to-market, R&D expense,
and idiosyncratic risk. All other variables are defined in Table 4.
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Table 6
Summary statistics for the determinants of grants and exercises
of non-executive equity incentives from stock option plans

Variable

Mean

Std Dev

Q1

Median

Q3

Cash flow shortfallt-1

0.02

0.08

-0.02

0.01

0.04

Book-to-markett-1

0.64

0.23

0.47

0.65

0.83

R&Dt-1

0.04

0.07

0.00

0.00

0.05

Long-term debt indicatort-1

0.90

0.30

1.00

1.00

1.00

Interest burdent-1

0.20

0.23

0.06

0.13

0.24

Low marginal taxt-1

0.02

0.15

0.00

0.00

0.00

High marginal taxt-1

0.56

0.50

0.00

1.00

1.00

Stock returnt

0.26

0.41

0.02

0.22

0.44

Stock returnt-1

0.19

0.41

-0.07

0.13

0.36

ResidualLog of incentives model t-1

0.04

0.63

-0.35

0.07

0.44

ResidualLog of incentives per employee model t-1

0.03

0.78

-0.44

0.04

0.53

20.90

1.73

19.90

21.00

22.08

Log(# of employees)t-1

8.62

1.75

7.59

8.67

9.79

Fraction of BS value realizablet-1

0.09

1.41

0.10

0.43

0.65

Number of recent price lowst

0.75

1.33

0.00

0.00

1.00

Number of recent price highst

3.62

2.62

1.00

3.00

6.00

Stock returnt+1

0.15

0.41

-0.10

0.12

0.35

Log(sales)t-1

The sample consists of 1,263 firm-year observations from 1995 to 1997. Cash flow shortfall is the three-year average of
[(common and preferred dividends + cash flow from investing - cash flow from operations)/total assets]. Book-to-market is
(book value of assets) / (book value of liabilities + market value of equity). R&D is the three-year average of research and
development expense scaled by assets. Long-term debt indicator is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has longterm debt outstanding, and zero otherwise. Interest burden is the three-year average of interest expense scaled by operating
income before depreciation. Negative values of interest burden and values greater than one are set equal to one. Low
marginal tax is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has negative taxable income and net operating loss carryforwards in each of the three years prior to the year the new equity grant is awarded, and zero otherwise. High marginal tax
is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has positive taxable income and no net operating loss carry-forwards in each
of the three years prior to the year the new equity grant is awarded, and zero otherwise. Stock returnt is the percentage
return on the firm’s stock in the fiscal year in which incentives are awarded. Stock returnt-1 is the percentage return on the
firm’s stock in the fiscal year prior to which incentives are awarded. The three incentive residuals are the residuals from
regressions of the incentives from stock options on their determinants as estimated in Table 5. Log(sales) is the logarithm of
the firm's sales. Log(# of employees) is the logarithm of the number of employees. Fraction of BS value realizable is equal
to (beginning of year stock price minus average exercise price of options held) divided by beginning of year Black-Scholes
value per option held. Number of recent price lows is the number of months within the current year that the stock price hits
a 12-month low. Number of recent price highs is the number of months within the current year that the stock price hits a 12month high. Stock returnt+1 is the percentage return on the firm’s stock in the fiscal year in after incentives are awarded.
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Table 7
Simultaneous estimation of non-executive equity incentive grants and exercises:
Grant model
Grant model: Dependent variable
Independent
variable

Predicted
sign

Log of incentives
Log of incentives
granted per
grantedt
employeet
(1)
(2)

Cash flow shortfallt-1

+

2.25
(4.74)

1.26
(2.40)

Book-to-markett-1

-

-2.45
(-8.23)

-2.61
(-7.29)

R&Dt-1

+

2.27
(3.87)

2.81
(4.57)

Long-term debt indicator t-1

-

-0.14
(-1.17)

-0.20
(-1.36)

Interest burden t-1

+

0.39
(2.16)

0.34
(1.70)

Low marginal taxt-1

+

0.37
(1.90)

-0.17
(-0.92)

High marginal taxt-1

-

-0.12
(-1.94)

-0.19
(-2.46)

Stock returnt

+

0.60
(4.74)

0.62
(4.35)

Stock returnt-1

+

-0.02
(-0.30)

-0.08
(-0.84)

Incentive residualt-1

-

0.39
(5.10)

0.66
(6.68)

Exercises of incentivest

+

0.20
(3.26)

0.11
(1.34)
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Table 7 (continued)
Simultaneous estimation of non-executive equity incentive grants and exercises:
Grant model
Grant model: Dependent variable
Independent
variable

Predicted
sign

Log(sales)t-1

?

Log(# of employees) t-1

?

Log of incentives
Log of incentives
granted per
grantedt
employeet
(1)
(2)
0.67
-0.06
(8.23)
(-2.04)
-0.02
(-0.35)

N

1,263

1,254

Adjusted R2

73.9%

67.3%

The sample consists of 1,263 firm-year observations from 1995 to 1997. T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on HuberWhite robust standard errors. Coefficients on an intercept, 22 industry indicator variables and two year indicator variables
not shown. The regression model is described by Equation (2) in Section 2.2. All dependent variables are based on options
granted to non-top-five employees and are measured at time t. Log of grants of equity incentives to non-executives (the
dependent variable in Column 1) is the log of the sensitivity of the value of new stock options granted to a 1% change in
stock price. Options are valued using the Black-Scholes (1973) model, as modified by Merton (1973) to account for
dividend payouts. The incentive residuals used in each column are the residuals from regressions of the incentives from
stock options on their determinants as estimated in Table 5. These residuals are estimated at the end of the fiscal year prior
to the fiscal year in which the grant of new equity incentives is awarded. All the independent variables are defined in Table
6. The form of the Exercises of incentives variable varies across the columns to match the form of the dependent variable.
For example, in Column 2 exercises are measured as log of incentives exercised per employee because the dependent
variable is log of incentives granted per employee.
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Table 8
Simultaneous estimation of non-executive equity incentive grants and exercises: Exercise model

Independent
variable

Predicted
sign

Exercise model: Dependent
variable
Log of incentives
Log of incentives exercised per
exercisedt
employeet
(1)
(2)

Incentive residualt-1

+

0.23
(2.71)

0.17
(2.15)

Grants of incentivest

+

0.96
(15.22)

0.99
(14.22)

Fraction of BS value realizablet-1

+

0.15
(4.07)

0.15
(4.05)

Number of recent price lowst

-

-0.19
(-5.06)

-0.17
(-4.84)

Number of recent price highst

+

0.10
(6.18)

0.10
(6.21)

Stock returnt+1

-

0.04
(0.54)

0.08
(1.04)

Stock returnt

?

-0.08
(-0.72)

-0.11
(-0.92)

Stock returnt-1

?

0.25
(2.59)

0.25
(2.65)

Log(Sales)t-1

?

0.08
(1.16)

0.08
(2.83)

Log(# of employees) t-1

?

0.00
(0.05)

N
Adjusted R2

1,263
76.5%

1,254
69.4%

The sample consists of 1,263 firm-year observations from 1995 to 1997. T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on HuberWhite robust standard errors. Coefficients on an intercept, 22 industry indicator variables and two year indicator variables
not shown. The regression model is described by Equation (3) in Section 2.3. All dependent variables are based on options
exercised by non-top-five employees and are measured at time t. Log of exercised equity incentives to non-executives (the
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dependent variable in Column 1) is the log of the sensitivity of the value of stock options exercised to a 1% change in stock
price. Options are valued using the Black-Scholes (1973) model, as modified by Merton (1973) to account for dividend
payouts. The incentive residuals used in each column are the residuals from regressions of the incentives from stock options
on their determinants as estimated in Table 5. These residuals are estimated at the end of the fiscal year prior to the fiscal
year in which the grant of new equity incentives is awarded. All the independent variables are defined in Table 6. The form
of the Grants of incentives variable varies across the columns to match the form of the dependent variable. For example, in
Column 2 grants are measured as log of incentives granted per employee because the dependent variable is log of incentives
exercises per employee.
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